The Machinery of Meaning: A Philosophical Foundation for Cognitive Science
Cognitive science models mental activity as digital computation. Yet many philosophers worry that computational modeling cannot honor a crucial feature of the mind: its capacity to represent the world. I will address this worry by trying to honor the mind's representational nature within a computational setting. I develop my approach by drawing on logic, Artificial Intelligence, and cognitive psychology. My goal is to delineate a novel view of how the mind works, a view that honors two compelling thoughts: first, that the mind is a machine; second, that the mind is an inherently representational organ. Such a view would illuminate ancient debates about the causal structure of mental activity. It would also provide a compelling new philosophical foundation for cognitive science. Finally, it would clarify the relation between minds and texts by clarifying a crucial aspect of both minds and texts: the capacity to represent.
[Grant products]
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Project fields:
Philosophy of Science
Program:
Fellowships for University Teachers
Division:
Research Programs
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Totals:
$50,400 (approved) $50,400 (awarded)
Grant period:
11/1/2011 – 10/31/2012
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