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Products for Grant FA-56218-11

FA-56218-11
Spinoza and German Idealism: A Metaphysical Dialogue
Yitzhak Melamed, Johns Hopkins University

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=FA-56218-11

Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought (Book)
Title: Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought
Author: Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Abstract: xx
Year: 2013
Publisher: New York: Oxford University Press
Type: Single author monograph
Copy sent to NEH?: Yes

“The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, Innate, yet False Cognitions (Article)
Title: “The Causes of Our Belief in Free Will: Spinoza on Necessary, Innate, yet False Cognitions
Author: Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Abstract: This paper discusses Spinoza’s critique of free will, though our brief study of this topic in the first part of the chapter will aim primarily at preparing us to address the main topic of the chapter, which is Spinoza’s explanation of the reasons which force us to believe in free will. At times, Spinoza seems to come very close to asserting the paradoxical claim that we are not free to avoid belief in free will. In the second part of the chapter I will closely examine Spinoza’s etiological explanation of how we come to form the belief in free will. In the third part, I will raise and respond to a crucial objection to Spinoza’s explanation of the formation of our belief in free will. I will then turn to examine Fichte’s intriguing claim that Spinoza’s position on the issue of free will suffers from an internal contradiction, as evinced in Fichte’s suggestive remark: “Spinoza could not have been convinced of his own philosophy. He could only have thought of it; he could not have believed it [Er konnte seine Philosphie nur denken, nicht sie glauben].”
Year: 2016
Primary URL: https://www.academia.edu/19675256/_The_Causes_of_Our_Belief_in_Free_Will_Spinoza_on_Innate_Necessary_and_yet_False_Cognitions_in_Yitzhak_Y._Melamed_ed._Spinoza_s_Ethics_A_Critical_Guide_Cambridge_Cambridge_University_Press_forthcoming_
Format: Other
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

“ ‘Omnis determinatio est negatio’ – Determination, Negation and Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel” (Article)
Title: “ ‘Omnis determinatio est negatio’ – Determination, Negation and Self-Negation in Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel”
Author: Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Abstract: The issue of negation and the possibility of self-negation stand at the very center of the philosophical dialogue between the systems of Spinoza and Hegel, and in this paper I will attempt to provide a preliminary explication of this foundational debate between the two systems. In the first part of the paper I will argue that the “determination is negation” formula has been understood in at least three distinct senses among the German Idealists, and as a result many of the participants in the discussion of this formula were actually talking past each other. The clarification of the three distinct senses of the formula will lead, in the second part of the paper, to a more precise evaluation of the fundamental debate between Spinoza and Hegel (and the German Idealists in general) regarding the possibility (or even necessity) of self-negation. In this part I will evaluate the validity of each interpretation of the determination formula, and motivate the positions of the various participants in the debate.
Year: 2012
Primary URL: https://www.academia.edu/784234/_Omnis_determinatio_est_negatio_Determination_Negation_and_Self-Negation_in_Spinoza_Kant_and_Hegel
Format: Other
Publisher: Cambridge University Press


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