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Products for grant FEL-268013-20

FEL-268013-20
Causation and Explanation in Aristotle
Nathanael Stein, Florida State University

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=FEL-268013-20

The Supposed Material Cause in Posterior Analytics II 11 (Article)
Title: The Supposed Material Cause in Posterior Analytics II 11
Author: Nathanael Stein
Abstract: Aristotle presents four causes in Posterior Analytics 2.11, but where we expect matter we find instead the confusing formula, ‘what things being the case, necessarily this is the case’, and an equally confusing example. Some commentators infer that Aristotle is not referring to matter, others that he is but in a non-standard way. I argue that APo. 94a20- 34 presents not matter, but determination by general features or facts, including facts about something’s genus. The closest connection to matter is Aristotle’s view that the relation between genus and species is analogous to that between matter and a hylo- morphic compound.
Year: 2021
Primary URL: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-BJA10034
Access Model: subscription only
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Phronesis
Publisher: Phronesis/Brill

Imagination, Expectation, and "Thoughts Entangled in Metaphors" (Article)
Title: Imagination, Expectation, and "Thoughts Entangled in Metaphors"
Author: Nathanael Stein
Abstract: George Eliot strikingly describes one of her characters as making a mistake because he has gotten his thoughts “entangled in metaphors,” saying that we all do the same. I argue that Eliot is here giving us more than an illuminating description, but drawing our attention to a distinctive kind of mistake—a form of irrationality, in fact—of which metaphor can be an ineliminable part of the correct explanation. Her fictional case helps illuminate both a neglected function of the imagination, and a pervasive way in which metaphor can affect it. The function is the creation and maintenance of what I call imaginative expectations, which are relatively stable imaginative representations of future events or experiences, analogous to latent memories. These imaginative expectations have a distinctive causal profile and distinct ways of interacting with other mental activities. I argue that their formation is subject to at least two norms—a “source” norm and an “experience” norm—and show how metaphorical framing can give rise to violations of either.
Year: 2021
Primary URL: https://doi-org.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/10.1007/s11229-021-03208-2
Access Model: subscription only
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Synthese
Publisher: Springer


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