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Products for grant FT-25259-84

FT-25259-84
Lewis Henry Morgan: Inventing Kinship
Thomas Trautmann, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=FT-25259-84

Dravidian Kinship. (Book)
Title: Dravidian Kinship.
Author: Trautmann, Thomas R.
Year: 1981
Primary URL: http://www.worldcat.org/isbn//9780521237031
Primary URL Description: WorldCat entry
Publisher: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Type: Single author monograph
ISBN: 9780521237031

One of the most popular and long-lived approaches to naturalizing the mind is the attempt to reduce mental phenomena to physical, biological, or neural phenomena. Reductionism has held a special allure among philosophers for a number of reasons: the intuitive appeal of part-whole explanations, reductive explanation's resemblance to the axiomatic method in mathematics, its apparent promise as a strategy for unifying different knowledge domains, and the fact that true reductions, when successful, are almost unique in yielding both metaphysical necessity and complete explanations. Reductionism was a very in uential view in philosophy of science, both in early modernity and through much of the twentieth century, and some central contemporary issues in philosophy of mind -- the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness -- are framed as claims that conscious mental states (and perhaps they alone) are not reducible to physical phenomena. In fact, however, most philosophers of science today would agree that true intertheoretic reductions are rare even in the natural sciences. I propose an explanation of both the appeal and the failure of reductionism in terms of a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science called Cognitive Pluralism, and then explore what implications post-reductionist philosophy of science has for philosophy of mind. If it is "explanatory gaps all the way down", what are the implications for dualism and for reductive, non-reductive and eliminative physicalisms? Is the mind-matter gap different from the other explanatory gaps? And, if the Cognitive Pluralist analysis is correct, is there any hope more generally for a "unified science", or that scientific theories generally can provide answers to metaphysical questions? (Book)
Title: One of the most popular and long-lived approaches to naturalizing the mind is the attempt to reduce mental phenomena to physical, biological, or neural phenomena. Reductionism has held a special allure among philosophers for a number of reasons: the intuitive appeal of part-whole explanations, reductive explanation's resemblance to the axiomatic method in mathematics, its apparent promise as a strategy for unifying different knowledge domains, and the fact that true reductions, when successful, are almost unique in yielding both metaphysical necessity and complete explanations. Reductionism was a very in uential view in philosophy of science, both in early modernity and through much of the twentieth century, and some central contemporary issues in philosophy of mind -- the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness -- are framed as claims that conscious mental states (and perhaps they alone) are not reducible to physical phenomena. In fact, however, most philosophers of science today would agree that true intertheoretic reductions are rare even in the natural sciences. I propose an explanation of both the appeal and the failure of reductionism in terms of a cognitivist approach to philosophy of science called Cognitive Pluralism, and then explore what implications post-reductionist philosophy of science has for philosophy of mind. If it is "explanatory gaps all the way down", what are the implications for dualism and for reductive, non-reductive and eliminative physicalisms? Is the mind-matter gap different from the other explanatory gaps? And, if the Cognitive Pluralist analysis is correct, is there any hope more generally for a "unified science", or that scientific theories generally can provide answers to metaphysical questions?
Author: Trautmann, Thomas R.
Year: 1987
Primary URL: http://www.worldcat.org/isbn//9780520064577
Primary URL Description: WorldCat entry
Publisher: Berkeley: University of California Press
Type: Single author monograph
ISBN: 9780520064577


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