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Products for grant FZ-256628-17

FZ-256628-17
Howard Hughes, the CIA, and the Untold Story Behind Their Hunt for a Sunken Soviet Submarine
Michael Bennett, East Carolina University

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=FZ-256628-17

"The Glomar Explorer: How an Operation to Salvage a Soviet Submarine Saved the CIA from Transparency" (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: "The Glomar Explorer: How an Operation to Salvage a Soviet Submarine Saved the CIA from Transparency"
Abstract: A ship ostensibly owned by reclusive billionaire Howard Hughes, the Hughes Glomar Explorer was actually the centerpiece of a 1970s-era CIA effort to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. The program, among the most ambitious in CIA history, originated in near-complete secrecy in 1968, the tail end of an era of intelligence permissiveness in which Congress exercised oversight so minimal as to constitute "undersight," one historian has remarked. Over the operation's seven-year lifespan, however, U.S. government efforts to shield certain facts from the public in the name of national security received closer scrutiny, leading, some say, to the dawn of the "sunshine era." Indeed, Glomar's unauthorized disclosure by journalists helped usher in the "Year of Intelligence," as the New York Times dubbed 1975, prompting members of Congress to call for a probe of the mission's high cost and even higher risk. Yet the outing of the ongoing intelligence activity also provoked a backlash among defense hawks, who vilified the media for damaging U.S. security and warned that congressional regulation would only cripple the CIA's ability to perform cutting-edge initiatives such as the "Great Submarine Snatch" in the future. That backlash restrained the press as well as Congress in their attempts to investigate U.S. intelligence activities, and it is among the reasons why Glomar played an underappreciated but pivotal role in saving the CIA from the clutches of transparency. In short, Glomar changed the conversation, working to establish new limits on the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate culture of disclosure. And this presentation tells the program's history both to provide an alternative perspective on the 1970s, a decade known for expansive openness, and to weigh in on America's perennial struggle to balance the demands of democracy with the need for secrecy in national security and foreign policy.
Author: M. Todd Bennett
Date: 12/12/18
Location: North American Society for Intelligence History, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

"Imagination Unlimted: How the CIA Raised a Sunken Soviet Submarine in the 1970s and Why it Matters Today" (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: "Imagination Unlimted: How the CIA Raised a Sunken Soviet Submarine in the 1970s and Why it Matters Today"
Abstract: A ship ostensibly owned by reclusive billionaire Howard Hughes, the Hughes Glomar Explorer was actually the centerpiece of a 1970s-era CIA effort to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. The program, among the most ambitious in CIA history, originated in near-complete secrecy in 1968, the tail end of an era of intelligence permissiveness in which Congress exercised oversight so minimal as to constitute "undersight," one historian has remarked. Over the operation's seven-year lifespan, however, U.S. government efforts to shield certain facts from the public in the name of national security received closer scrutiny, leading, some say, to the dawn of the "sunshine era." Indeed, Glomar's unauthorized disclosure by journalists helped usher in the "Year of Intelligence," as the New York Times dubbed 1975, prompting members of Congress to call for a probe of the mission's high cost and even higher risk. Yet the outing of the ongoing intelligence activity also provoked a backlash among defense hawks, who vilified the media for damaging U.S. security and warned that congressional regulation would only cripple the CIA's ability to perform cutting-edge initiatives such as the "Great Submarine Snatch" in the future. That backlash restrained the press as well as Congress in their attempts to investigate U.S. intelligence activities, and it is among the reasons why Glomar played an underappreciated but pivotal role in saving the CIA from the clutches of transparency. In short, Glomar changed the conversation, working to establish new limits on the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate culture of disclosure. And this presentation tells the program's history both to provide an alternative perspective on the 1970s, a decade known for expansive openness, and to weigh in on America's perennial struggle to balance the demands of democracy with the need for secrecy in national security and foreign policy.
Author: M. Todd Bennett
Date: 03/27/18
Location: Phi Kapp Phi honor society, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina

"The Glomar Explorer: How an Operation to Salvage a Soviet Submarine Saved the CIA from Transparency" (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: "The Glomar Explorer: How an Operation to Salvage a Soviet Submarine Saved the CIA from Transparency"
Abstract: A ship ostensibly owned by reclusive billionaire Howard Hughes, the Hughes Glomar Explorer was actually the centerpiece of a 1970s-era CIA effort to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. The program, among the most ambitious in CIA history, originated in near-complete secrecy in 1968, the tail end of an era of intelligence permissiveness in which Congress exercised oversight so minimal as to constitute "undersight," one historian has remarked. Over the operation's seven-year lifespan, however, U.S. government efforts to shield certain facts from the public in the name of national security received closer scrutiny, leading, some say, to the dawn of the "sunshine era." Indeed, Glomar's unauthorized disclosure by journalists helped usher in the "Year of Intelligence," as the New York Times dubbed 1975, prompting members of Congress to call for a probe of the mission's high cost and even higher risk. Yet the outing of the ongoing intelligence activity also provoked a backlash among defense hawks, who vilified the media for damaging U.S. security and warned that congressional regulation would only cripple the CIA's ability to perform cutting-edge initiatives such as the "Great Submarine Snatch" in the future. That backlash restrained the press as well as Congress in their attempts to investigate U.S. intelligence activities, and it is among the reasons why Glomar played an underappreciated but pivotal role in saving the CIA from the clutches of transparency. In short, Glomar changed the conversation, working to establish new limits on the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate culture of disclosure. And this presentation tells the program's history both to provide an alternative perspective on the 1970s, a decade known for expansive openness, and to weigh in on America's perennial struggle to balance the demands of democracy with the need for secrecy in national security and foreign policy.
Author: M. Todd Bennett
Date: 12/12/18
Location: North American Society for Intelligence History, Georgetown University, Washington, DC

"How the U.S. and Iran Can Avoid War: Plausible Deniability Can Give Both Countries Room to Maneuver" (Article)
Title: "How the U.S. and Iran Can Avoid War: Plausible Deniability Can Give Both Countries Room to Maneuver"
Author: M. Todd Bennett
Abstract: The diplomatic history of the U-2 incident suggests that plausible deniability offers an imperfect but effective way out of international standoffs — if countries choose to follow it.
Year: 2019
Primary URL: http://https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/06/25/how-us-iran-can-avoid-war/?utm_term=.404f19544a75
Access Model: Open access up to a point; subscription only thereafter.
Format: Newspaper
Periodical Title: Washington Post
Publisher: Washington Post


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