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Products for grant HB-231968-16

HB-231968-16
A Philosophical Treatment of the Ethics of Grief
Michael Cholbi, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=HB-231968-16

“Finding the good in grief: What Augustine knew but Meursault couldn’t.” (Article)
Title: “Finding the good in grief: What Augustine knew but Meursault couldn’t.”
Author: Michael Cholbi
Abstract: Meursault, the protagonist of Camus' The Stranger, is unable to grieve, a fact that ultimately leads to his condemnation and execution. Given the emotional distresses involved in grief, should we envy Camus or pity him? I defend the latter conclusion. As St. Augustine seemed to dimly recognize, the pains of grief are integral to the process of bereavement, a process that both motivates and provides a distinctive opportunity to attain the good of self-knowledge.
Year: 2017
Primary URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association/article/finding-the-good-in-grief-what-augustine-knew-that-meursault-could-not/20AFF8F45B395B722CF8A1DA39E3DBE1
Access Model: Access via American Philosophical Association
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Journal of the American Philosophical Association
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Grief and End-of-life Surrogate Decision Making (Book Section)
Title: Grief and End-of-life Surrogate Decision Making
Author: Michael Cholbi
Editor: John Davis
Abstract: Because an increasing number of patients have medical conditions that render them incompetent at making their own medical choices, more and more medical choices are now made by surrogates, often patient family members. However, many studies indicate that surrogates often do not discharge their responsibilities adequately, and in particular, do not choose in accordance with what those patients would have chosen for themselves, especially when it comes to end-of-life medical choices. This chapter argues that a significant part of the explanation of such surrogate failure is that family surrogates are likely to undergo anticipatory grief when making end-of-life decisions. After clarifying both the emotional structure and object of grief, I propose that the pending death of a loved one induces an emotional conflict in surrogates between the care demanded by their responsibility as surrogates and the attachment surrogates feel toward their dying loved one, an attachment surrogates "resolve" in the direction of attachment rather than care. This hypothesis helps to explain both surrogates' general inability to exercise "substituted judgment" on behalf of their loved ones and a wide swath of the particular data regarding this inability (e.g., that surrogates more often err by choosing overtreatment). I conclude by considering possible clinical and philosophical responses to this hypothesis.
Year: 2017
Primary URL: https://www.routledge.com/Ethics-at-the-End-of-Life-New-Issues-and-Arguments/Davis/p/book/9781138829756
Publisher: Routledge
Book Title: Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments
ISBN: 9781138829756

The Duty to Grieve (Conference Paper/Presentation)
Title: The Duty to Grieve
Author: Michael Cholbi
Abstract: Robert Solomon’s “On grief and gratitude” is perhaps the best known contemporary philosophical article on grief. There Solomon makes the provocative claim that there is a duty to grieve – that those who do not grieve or do not grieve sufficiently are subject to “the most severe moral censure,” that as a “moral emotion,” grief is not only an “appropriate reaction to the loss of a loved one, but also in a strong sense obligatory.” While Solomon offer reasons why grief speaks positively of a person’s relations with others and why grief may contribute to the bereaved’s well-being, he does not offer an explicit argument for the obligatoriness of grief. Here I consider a number of routes by which such a claim might be defended. If there is a duty to grieve, its object must be other living people (those with whom one shares grief at a particular person’s death), the deceased for whom one grieves, or oneself. The first two, I argue, are likely to be candidates for duties of mourning, i.e., duties to engage in public or ritualistic memorialization or acknowledgements of the deceased’s death, etc. Only the last, a duty to grieve owed to oneself, is a credible candidate for a duty to grieve. For insofar as grief is an egocentric activity, it responds to the death of a person with whom one stands in an identity-constituting relationship and hence involves the attempt to re-establish or place on new terms that relationship in light of that individual’s death. The source of a self-concerning duty to grieve is that grief thus represents both an opportunity for, and motivator of, self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of one’s practical identity and values. The duty to grieve, I conclude, is a non-enforceable duty to oneself whose non-fulfillment should elicit agent-centered regret.
Date: 01/06/18
Conference Name: American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting

The Duty to Grieve (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: The Duty to Grieve
Abstract: Robert Solomon’s “On grief and gratitude” is perhaps the best known contemporary philosophical article on grief. There Solomon makes the provocative claim that there is a duty to grieve – that those who do not grieve or do not grieve sufficiently are subject to “the most severe moral censure,” that as a “moral emotion,” grief is not only an “appropriate reaction to the loss of a loved one, but also in a strong sense obligatory.” While Solomon offer reasons why grief speaks positively of a person’s relations with others and why grief may contribute to the bereaved’s well-being, he does not offer an explicit argument for the obligatoriness of grief. Here I consider a number of routes by which such a claim might be defended. If there is a duty to grieve, its object must be other living people (those with whom one shares grief at a particular person’s death), the deceased for whom one grieves, or oneself. The first two, I argue, are likely to be candidates for duties of mourning, i.e., duties to engage in public or ritualistic memorialization or acknowledgements of the deceased’s death, etc. Only the last, a duty to grieve owed to oneself, is a credible candidate for a duty to grieve. For insofar as grief is an egocentric activity, it responds to the death of a person with whom one stands in an identity-constituting relationship and hence involves the attempt to re-establish or place on new terms that relationship in light of that individual’s death. The source of a self-concerning duty to grieve is that grief thus represents both an opportunity for, and motivator of, self-knowledge, that is, knowledge of one’s practical identity and values. The duty to grieve, I conclude, is a non-enforceable duty to oneself whose non-fulfillment should elicit agent-centered regret.
Author: Michael Cholbi
Date: 05/08/18
Location: Deakin University, Australia

Self-knowledge and the paradox of grief (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: Self-knowledge and the paradox of grief
Abstract: The Women of Lockerbie is held up as a model for the good of grief, namely, that grief enables the reconstruction of practical identity after the death of a person central to that identity.
Author: Michael Cholbi
Date: 05/11/17
Location: Pomona, California

The paradox of grief (Public Lecture or Presentation)
Title: The paradox of grief
Abstract: Grief feels bad, but is (or at least can be) good for us. How is this paradox best resolved?
Author: Michael Cholbi
Date: 11/14/17
Location: Pomona, California

The Stranger, the Saint, and the Grief’s Goodness (Article)
Title: The Stranger, the Saint, and the Grief’s Goodness
Author: Michael Cholbi
Abstract: Can grief only be emotionally distressing or can it be redemptive and worthwhile or even vital? Philosopher Michael Cholbi examines the protagonist of Albert Camus’ existentialist novel The Stranger and brings him in dialogue with St. Augustine’s The Confessions, in order to examine the potential of ethical self-knowledge as a consequence of grief.
Year: 2017
Primary URL: http://www.fourbythreemagazine.com/issue/death/the-stranger-the-saint-and-griefs-goodness
Access Model: Open access
Format: Magazine
Periodical Title: IIIIXIII (Four by Three)
Publisher: n/a


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