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Products for Grant HB-50471-14

HB-50471-14
Acquainted with Grief: Early Modern Feminist Conceptions of God, Evil, and Theodicy
Jill Hernandez, University of Texas, San Antonio

Grant details: https://securegrants.neh.gov/publicquery/main.aspx?f=1&gn=HB-50471-14

Early Modern Women and the Problem of Evil: Atrocity & Theodicy (Book)
Title: Early Modern Women and the Problem of Evil: Atrocity & Theodicy
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Editor: Eve Mayer
Abstract: Early Modern Women and the Problem of Evil examines the concept of theodicy?the attempt to reconcile divine perfection with the existence of evil?through the lens of early modern female scholars. This timely volume knits together the perennial problem of defining evil with current scholarly interest in women’s roles in the evolution of religious philosophy. Accessible for those without a background in philosophy or theology, Jill Graper Hernandez’s text will be of interest to upper-level undergraduates as well as graduate students and researchers.
Year: 2016
Primary URL: https://www.routledge.com/Early-Modern-Women-and-the-Problem-of-Evil-Atrocity--Theodicy/Hernandez/p/book/9781138122345
Primary URL Description: This is the publisher's URL
Secondary URL: https://smile.amazon.com/Early-Modern-Women-Problem-Evil/dp/1138122343/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1469033915&sr=8-1&keywords=atrocity+%26+theodicy
Secondary URL Description: This is the URL for the book on Amazon.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 978-1138122345
Copy sent to NEH?: No

Acquainted with Grief: the Atonement and Early Modern Conceptions of Kenosis (Article)
Title: Acquainted with Grief: the Atonement and Early Modern Conceptions of Kenosis
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the problem of evil and a kenotic view of the Atonement evidenced not just by feminist theologians, but by analytic philosophers of religion. (“Kenosis”, from the Greek ????s??, “emptiness,” generally refers to the emptying of the self, and more specifically refers to the passion of Christ, during which Christ suffered on behalf of humanity.) I will argue that, although kenosis provides an interesting story about the ability of Christ to partake in human suffering, it faces debilitating problems for understanding divine concurrence with evil in the world. Most significantly, I will argue that the potential tensions between divine justice (in holding wrong- doers responsible) and divine love (for those who suffer) can be loosened by looking at ‘redemptive accounts’ of theodicy in the scholarship of women writing in the early modern period in philosophy, particularly Mary Hays (1759–1843), and Catharine Macaulay (1731–1791).1 Their work collectively confirms the problem of concrete evil (that is, not just that evil must be logically possible in order for God to create the best possible world, but that atrocious harms are pernicious to a perfectly existing necessary being) and yet offers a unique theodicy grounded in the saving power of the Atonement and restorative power of Christian service. Their arguments are all the more compelling for having been written in response to egregious civil rights abuses and rampant domestic violence of their day. If the Atonement is the divinely-ordained method for gaining insight into the redemptive power of divine grace, then rather than speculating about the metaphysical nature of the divine, this paper will question how we can understand divine perfection in light of evil in the world, especially if the Atonement of Christ involves kenosis.
Year: 2015
Primary URL: http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/608/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11406-014-9568-0.pdf?originUrl=http%3A%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1007%2Fs11406-014-9568-0&token2=exp=1469035312~acl=%2Fstatic%2Fpdf%2F608%2Fart%25253A10.1007%25252Fs11406-014-956
Primary URL Description: Springer's "Philosophia" website
Access Model: Subscription, some free access
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: Philosophia
Publisher: Philosophia (a Springer journal)

Human Value, Dignity, and the Presence of Others (Article)
Title: Human Value, Dignity, and the Presence of Others
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: In the health care professions, the meaning of—and implications for—‘dignity’ and ‘value’ are progressively more important, as scholars and practitioners increasingly have to make value judgments when making care decisions. This paper looks at the various arguments for competing sources of human value that medical professionals can consider—human rights, autonomy, and a higher-order moral value—and settles upon a foundational model that is related to (though distinct from) the Kantian model that is popular within the medical community: human value is foundational; human dignity, autonomy, and rights derive from the relational quality of human dignity. Moral dignity is expressed though the relationships we cultivate, the communal ends we pursue, and the rights we enjoy. Correlatively, human dignity is inseparable from its ground (i.e., morality), and the relationship between these two is best represented for Kant in the humanities formulation. The foundational model of dignity ensures that human value is non-circularly derived, but is ultimately tied to expressions of individual human dignity that comes from the dignity of morality. Linking Kant’s dignity of humanity to the dignity of morality affords a unique and efficacious response to the discussion of human value. In one sense, dignity is amplificatory, since its worth is inextricable with that of autonomy and the rights afforded to the autonomous. But that isn’t to say that the worth of dignity is merely amplificatory. Rather, human dignity indicates the absolute inner value (MM 6:435) found in each individual in virtue of being human (MM 6:435, 462). That inner worth engenders certain universal rights—derivable from the dignity and fundamental rational appeal of morality—just as it provides for the possibility for a community of beings to seek to live the moral life.
Year: 2015
Primary URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10730-015-9271-y
Primary URL Description: Springer's HEC Forum webpage to article.
Access Model: subscription
Format: Journal
Periodical Title: HealthCare Ethics Community (HEC) Forum (Springer)
Publisher: HealthCare Ethics Community (HEC) Forum (Springer)

"On Un-Gendering Evil: Theodicy and Women in the Early Modern Period" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "On Un-Gendering Evil: Theodicy and Women in the Early Modern Period"
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: This invited paper debunks the now wide-spread claim that approaches to concrete evil are committed to a "gendered" conception of evil in the world. By looking at the views of concrete evil held by Mary Astell, Margaret Cavendish, Catharine Macaulay, and Mary Wollstonecraft-- women in the early modern period of philosophy who each are committed attempt to battle concrete, atrocious harm-- today's ethicists can focus on transformative practices to eradicate horrendous evil.
Date Range: September 17-18, 2016
Location: University of Massachusetts-Lowell, Society of Analytical Feminism
Primary URL: https://sites.google.com/site/analyticalfeminism/

"Existential Hope: A Transmuted Goods Reply to the Problem of Evil" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Existential Hope: A Transmuted Goods Reply to the Problem of Evil"
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: This invited paper observes that the success of the atrocity paradigm’s problem of evil argument depends upon the transmutativity aspect of atrocities (i.e., that atrocious harms irrevocably negatively alter the great good of the sufferer’s life). I argue that transmutativity cuts both ways, and that existential hope (as conceived by Gabriel Marcel) functions as a transmuted good by restoring dignity to those who suffer. If hope is a transmuted good, overrides the consequences of atrocious harm, and emerges from a system of goods that cannot be explained by the atrocity paradigm, then the atheist’s conclusion that evil ought to be rescued from theism cannot follow. Existential hope thus serves as a unique response to the problem of evil.
Date Range: May 19-21, 2016
Location: Texas A&M University, College Station, TX; Southwest Seminar in Continental Philosophy
Primary URL: http://philosophy.tamu.edu/events/swscp2016/

"Early Modern (Female) Theodicy, Almost without Apology" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Early Modern (Female) Theodicy, Almost without Apology"
Author: Jill Hernandez
Abstract: This invited main-program APA paper argues that early modern women made significant, unique contributions to the philosophy of religion. Further, I contend that, upon analysis, their views map onto contemporary atheist conceptions of evil while forwarding theodical arguments. I then conclude by sketching out a framework for a new theory of goods, "transmuted goods", which can combat atrocious harm in the world.
Date Range: March 30-April 3, 2016
Location: American Philosophical Association Pacific Division (main program), San Francisco, CA
Primary URL: http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.apaonline.org/resource/resmgr/Pacific2016/P2016_Meeting_Program_web.pdf

"Love and Atrocity: Can Transmuted Goods Explain Obligations?" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Love and Atrocity: Can Transmuted Goods Explain Obligations?"
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: All ethicists, even atrocity paradigm atheists, want a moral theory to explain why we have positive moral duties to love victims of atrocities. We should also expect that the atrocity paradigm could account for the ability of some sufferers to recreate meaning in their lives after an atrocity. The paradigm struggles to do either. Instead, certain moral goods—goods like forgiveness, altruism, generosity, or kindness-- provide evidence against the paradigm's view that atrocious harms deprive a person from living a tolerable life. This paper argues that love, as a foundational ‘transmuted good’ that functions within a part of a correlative moral system, better explains our moral obligation to others, a universal duty to preserve human dignity, and the ability to create meaning after an atrocity. The result is either that the atrocity paradigm is a flawed moral system, or that theism provides a stronger account of moral obligation to prevent atrocity.
Date Range: May 6-7. 2016
Location: The Meaning of Love Conference, Biola University (La Mirada, CA)
Primary URL: https://cct.biola.edu/static/media/downloads/the-meaning-of-love-conference-program.pdf

"Marcel's Hope as a Transmuted Good: A Reply to the Atrocity Paradigm" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Marcel's Hope as a Transmuted Good: A Reply to the Atrocity Paradigm"
Author: Jill Hernandez
Abstract: This paper reveals an antinomy in existentialist Gabriel Marcel’s conception of evil, and argues that Marcel’s view of a feeling of hopeful existence is better understood by working through the antinomy. Although Marcel clearly argues that evil and suffering are facets of our lived experiences in the world, he is much less clear about whether evil is solvable and what the implications of evil’s presence in the world are for what can we can reasonably hope for. In the following, I map out Marcel’s conception of evil onto his fundamental distinction between problem and mystery, show that the distinction creates two effective methodologies for dealing with evil in the world (the problem approach and the mystery approach), draw the antinomy of evil based on these methodologies, and then demonstrate that the antinomy can be dissolved through an existentially-engaged, communal encounter with evil. Dissolving the antinomy facilitates Marcel’s vision of transforming the encounter of evil through a love that brings a feeling of hope—for all, regardless of existential or theistic commitment.
Date Range: December 3-4, 2015
Location: Queen's College (Flushing, NY), Redemption of Feeling: The Religious Existentialists Conference
Primary URL: http://www.apaonline.org/events/EventDetails.aspx?id=633645

"Intersubjectivity and Narrative Theodicy; Atrocity and O'Connor" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Intersubjectivity and Narrative Theodicy; Atrocity and O'Connor"
Author: Jill Hernandez
Abstract: This paper will bridge the gap between the analytic, theodical use of second-personal narratives and the atrocious harm arguments of atheists through a relational narrative account that borrows heavily from Flannery O’Connor’s sense of intersubjectivity. Although the project of using narrative as a way to do theodicy should be preserved, this paper will cast doubt on the ability of second-personal narratives to meet the criticisms of the atrocity paradigm, and will instead suggest that first-person plural standpoint can better rescue narrative as a theodical tool. The conditions of intersubjectivity found within O’Connor require more than mere interconnectedness among characters, and more than seeing others as only ‘others,’ but as intrinsically bound up with the sense of self . The result is such that, for narratives to be efficacious in theodicy, they must facilitate: a)mutual respect between agents, which is absent between the empowered and the oppressed; b) an univocal relationship between agents when a moral claim is made-- although power relationships are frequently equivocal and, for the oppressed, implicitly threatening; and c) a felicity condition in which the addressee has reason to respond to the claim made by the narrative, even though feminists would argue that such a consideration disproportionately negatively impacts women.
Date Range: September 17-19, 2015
Location: Georgia State College, Flannery O'Connor and Other Southern Writers Conference
Primary URL: http://www.gcsu.edu/sites/files/page-assets/node-906/attachments/program.pdf

"Can Leibniz's Theodicy Account for Atrocious Harm?" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Can Leibniz's Theodicy Account for Atrocious Harm?"
Author: Jill Hernandez
Abstract: Rather than assess the merits of the contemporary distinction between abstract and concrete evil, then, we can use it to revisit Leibnizian theodicy to answer, first, whether there is textual support in Theodicy for the distinction, and second, if Leibniz’s theodicy can justify divine perfection in the face of atrocious harms. Delineating between concrete, particular and concrete, atrocious harms has several benefits for Leibniz scholarship. This allows Leibnizian theodicy to rigorously (rather than incidentally) engage with concrete evil—and so the Theodicy can duck the atheist’s contention that it fails to engage with the lived experience of suffering. My distinction also removes the burden from Leibniz’s theodicy to demonstrate that, for each person who suffers, evil contributes to the good whole of the individual’s life, since the concrete evils that are explainable by theodicy are a genre, rather than an instance. Finally, it preserves Leibniz’s view that the goodness of God extends to the particular, relative to the whole, if God’s best possible world includes a system of goods that can mitigate the system of atrocious harm perpetuated by evil human action.
Date Range: July 3-6, 2015
Location: Lampeter Campus of University of Wales, Trinity Saint David

"Narrative and Suffering: the Problem of Standpoint" (Conference/Institute/Seminar)
Title: "Narrative and Suffering: the Problem of Standpoint"
Author: Jill Graper Hernandez
Abstract: ABSTRACT: Philosophers of religion have recently argued that second-personal narratives can be an effective theodical tool to defend divine perfection against the problem of evil. What it means to suffer, for example, is best conveyed by a second-personal standpoint, and narratives are able to connote this meaning in a way which resists propositional form.1 Critics—especially atheist feminist proponents of a secularized concept of ‘evil’—contend that theists can never successfully use narrative as a defense against the problem of evil because Scripture fails to speak to those who truly suffer from (especially) atrocious harms, and the narratives are never spoken by them since all of the narrators within the biblical text are men.2 Theologians have been particularly keen to show that narratives can produce theological knowledge3, but this paper will argue that philosophy’s theodical use of narrative accounts can bridge the gap between the atrocious harm arguments of contemporary atheists and the epistemic function of theology’s second-person standpoint. A caution will be given to philosophers, however: Although the project of utilizing narrative as a way to do theodicy should be preserved, this paper will cast doubt on the ability of second-personal narratives to effectively answer the criticisms elicited by the atrocity paradigm, and will instead suggest that a first-person epistemic standpoint can better rescue narrative as a theodical tool.
Date Range: July 16-20, 2014
Location: Berkeley Dominican School of Philosophy & Theology Conference, Berkeley, CA


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